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ABSTRACT
Cybercriminals exploit cryptocurrencies to carry out illicit activities.
In this paper, we focus on Ponzi schemes that operate on Bitcoin
and perform an in-depth analysis of MMM, one of the oldest and
most popular Ponzi schemes. Based on 423K transactions involving
16K addresses, we show that: (1) Starting Sep 2014, the scheme goes
through three phases over three years. At its peak, MMM circulated
more than 150M dollars a day, after which it collapsed by the end
of Jun 2016. (2) There is a high income inequality between MMM
members, with the daily Gini index reaching more than 0.9. The
scheme also exhibits a zero-sum investment model, in which one
member’s loss is another member’s gain. The percentage of victims
who nevermade any profit has grown from 0% to 41% in fivemonths,
during which the top-earning scammer has made 765K dollars in
profit. (3) The scheme has a global reach with 80 different member
countries but a highly-asymmetrical flow of money between them.
While India and Indonesia have the largest pairwise flow in MMM,
members in Indonesia have received 12x more money than they
have sent to their counterparts in India.
1 INTRODUCTION
Cryptocurrencies represent an alternative to the centralized, highly-
regulated financial systems [34]. Bitcoin, for example, facilitates
sending and receiving money without relying on third-parties, such
as banks. However, the decentralized control that underpins cryp-
tocurrencies has garnered unwanted attention from cybercriminals,
who exploit them to evade financial regulations and engage in vari-
ous illicit activities, including financial fraud [15, 43, 44] and money
laundering [14, 32, 40].
In this paper, we focus on Ponzi schemes that use Bitcoin for their
operations [45]. In concept, a Ponzi scheme, also known as a high-
yield investment program (HYIP), is a fraudulent investing scam
promising high rates of return with low risk to investors. The return
on investment (ROI) for early investors in a Ponzi scheme is gener-
ated by acquiring new investors. While online Ponzi schemes have
been studied for a while [2, 13, 30], the use of Bitcoin introduces
unique challenges that make them harder to investigation [4, 5, 30].
In particular, it is unclear how to identify and characterize the Ponzi
operation, given Bitcoin’s pseudo-anonymous privacy model [34].
We bridge this knowledge gap and present a method to investigate
the operation of Ponzi schemes by linking and analyzing data col-
lected from multiple public sources. We apply this method in the
real-world and characterize the operation of MMM [13], one of the
oldest and most popular Ponzi schemes on Bitcoin (§2).
We crawled 2.5M user profiles on BitcoinTalk,1 a famous discus-
sion forum, searching for Bitcoin addresses associated with MMM
members, ending up with 15,736 addresses. We then extracted the
corresponding transactions from Bitcoin’s blockchain, ending up
with 422,953 transaction (§3).
Using the collected dataset, we analyzed the lifecycle of MMM in
terms of its daily transaction volume and money flow. In particular,
we studied the scheme under three formally-defined phases based
on volume, namely bootstrap, hyperoperation, and collapse, under
which MMM operated for three years starting on Sep 1, 2014. At its
peak, the scheme circulated more than 150M dollars a day, before
starting to collapse on Jun 29, 2016. We also analyzed the fraudulent
operation of MMM, focusing on income inequality amongmembers,
return on investment, and member classification. We computed the
daily Gini index [20], which measures the distribution of income
across a group of people, and found a highly-skewed concentra-
tion, with values reaches more than 0.9 and an overall average
of 0.65. The scheme also exhibited a Ponzi zero-sum investment
model, in which a member’s profit is another member’s loss, except
for nearly 73M dollars that were sent to unknown addresses. The
percentage of victims, who are members that never made a profit,
increased from 0% to 41% in five months, after which the scheme
started to collapse, with the top-earning scammer making 765K
dollars in profit. We then analyzed the external flow of money in
which money is sent to or receive from MMM addresses as deposit
or withdrawal transactions, respectively. We found that most of
the deposits (85.54%) and withdrawals (91.57%) are associated with
unknown addresses, but for those which we were able to identify,
the highest percentages were associated with exchange services,
with 4.8x more withdrawals than deposits. Finally, we analyzed the
geopolitics of MMM, focusing on how much money flows between
countries. Among 80 different member countries, we found that
the largest flow of money, which was between India and Indonesia,
is 10x larger than the smallest flow, which was between Thailand
and Taiwan. This pairwise money flow, however, is highly asym-
metrical and could impact local economies. For example, members
in Indonesia have received 12x more money than they have sent to
their counterparts in India (§4).
To this end, we discuss the implications of our findings for cryp-
tocurrency regulations, economy, and user privacy (§5). We sum-
marize our contributions in the following:
(1) We propose an analytical method and a set ofmetrics which
are useful in investigating Ponzi schemes that operate with
cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin.
1https://bitcointalk.org
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Table 1: Bitcoin address types and regex patterns.
Type Description Regex pattern
P2PKH Pay to public key hash 1[a-km-zA-HJ-NP-Z1-9]{25,34}
P2SH Pay to script hash 3[a-km-zA-HJ-NP-Z1-9]{25,34}
Bech32 Segregated witness bc1[a-zA-HJ-NP-Z0-9]{25,39}
(2) We present the first in-depth, temporal characterization of
a real-world Ponzi scheme on Bitcoin.
(3) We share a unique dataset of Bitcoin transactions and ad-
dresses which are associated with MMM.
2 BACKGROUND
We now present the background for this work.
2.1 Bitcoin
Bitcoin is the first and themost popular cryptocurrency network [34].
In Bitcoin, the identity of a user is hidden by using public pseudonyms
called addresses. A Bitcoin address is an alphanumeric identifier
that is derived from the public key of a public/private key pair. It
has three different formats that are in use today, each defining an
address type, as shown in Table 1.
The set of public/private keys that are owned by a user is called
a wallet. Private keys are used to sign inputs of transactions as
a proof of ownership. To protect a transaction, the user sending
the money signs the transaction using her private keys, and then
broadcasts it to the network for verification.
Bitcoin transactions are stored in a public, decentralized ledger
called a blockchain, which means anyone could try to identify user
transactions by analyzing the blockchain. Doing so, however, is
difficult since user identities are not recorded in the blockchain,
only Bitcoin addresses. As such, Bitcoin’s privacy model is pseudo-
anonymous; if user identities are linked to Bitcoin addresses, their
transactions can be identified. This is the case when users publicly
post their Bitcoin addresses along with their personally identifiable
information (PII), commonly found in forums like BitcoinTalk.
It is possible to exchange bitcoins with fiat currencies through
centralized cryptocurrency exchange services, such as Luno2 and
Huobi,3 or decentralized ones, such as WavesDex.4 While largely
unregulated, the price is often based on supply and demand, but can
still vary significantly during a trading day. Services like CoinDesk5
aggregate pricing data from exchanges and providemarket statistics,
such as open/close and high/low values for a trading day.
2.2 MMM
MMM is a Russian Ponzi schemewhichwas founded in the 1990s [13].
It operated as an investment fund and has defrauded millions of
people around the globe by promising dividends of up to 3,000% a
year. In Jul 1994, the Russian police shut down MMM for illegally
issuing unregistered securities. The scheme, however, reopened in
2011 as MMM Global,6 with subsidiaries in 110 countries. MMM is
2https://www.luno.com
3https://www.huobi.com
4https://client.wavesplatform.com
5https://www.coindesk.com
6https://mmmglobal.world
Figure 1: MMMmember dashboard showing a help request.
popular in Africa [17] and Asia [36], which is partly attributed to
poverty, lack of regulations or law enforcement, and limited access
to financial institution such as banks.
MMM operates as a mutual aid fund where people help each
other. A user can get financial help of up to 10K dollars worth of
bitcoins. Providing and getting help, however, is done in MMM’s
virtual currency called Mavro, which is pegged with Bitcoin at a
fixed exchange rate of 1 bitcoin = 1 mavro. New MMM members
start with no mavro, and the only way to buy it is to provide help,
as shown in Figure 1. Once help is provided in the form of a Bitcoin
transaction, the user receives mavro that is equivalent to the input
value of the transaction, in addition to a 30% monthly return. For
example, when Alice helps Bob by transferring 0.1 bitcoins, she
immediately receives 0.1 mavro, which will turn into 0.13 mavro
in a month if she does not sell them. Members can opt into a 100%
return rate by joiningMMMExtra and perform simple daily tasks to
promote MMM’s global operations, such as liking YouTube videos,
posting on Facebook groups, and joining BitcoinTalk forums.
3 DATASET
We crawled BitcoinTalk to search for users whose profiles contain
Bitcoin addresses and also point to their member profiles on MMM,
ending up with 15,736 unique useraddressmember matches out
of 2.5M user profiles.7 We then used BlockSci [25] to collect the
transactions which involve addresses associated with MMM mem-
bers from Bitcoin’s blockchain, ending up with 422,953 transactions.
Our goal is to collect Bitcoin addresses and transactions which
are highly-likely to be associated with MMMmembers. As such, we
follow stringent validation rules that consequently lead to a smaller
dataset and lower estimates of how much money is involved. This
dataset size vs. quality tradeoff is typical in e-crime investigations
and forensics [19], where a small but reliable sample is considered
better than a large but noisy one, as long as the underlaying prop-
erties are preserved and captured. While we focus on collecting a
high-quality dataset, we discuss ways to increase its size in §5.
3.1 Ponzi addresses
BitcoinTalk is one of the most popular Bitcoin discussion forums.
As of May 2019, it hosted more than 50M posts. Given its popularity,
7For privacy reasons, we replace user identifiers with pseudonyms, such as Alice and
Bob, and show only the first 10 characters of any of their Bitcoin addresses or wallets.
2
Investigating MMM Ponzi scheme on Bitcoin Technical Report, December, 2019
Figure 2: BitcoinTalk user profile showing a link to MMM.
we used it as a source to collect Bitcoin addresses that are associated
with MMM members.
We crawled 2.5M BitcoinTalk user profiles by downloading each
profile page using a URL which is indexed by a user identifier. This
resulted in 64 GB of profile pages in HTML format. We then parsed
the pages to find Bitcoin addresses using regular expressions (§2.1).
This resulted in 39,321 addresses, each associated with a unique
user profile. We identify MMMmembers based on the content of the
website information declared in user profiles, as shown in Figure 2.
In particular, if a user profile contains a hyperlink to a member
profile on MMM, that is, a URL containing “mmmglobal” substring
followed by a member identifier, we label the corresponding user
as an MMM member. Out of 39,321 profile pages with Bitcoin ad-
dresses, we were able to label 24,200 profiles (61.54%) as MMM
members with 22,950 unique Bitcoin addresses. As some profiles
declared the same Bitcoin address, 2,327 (9.61%) in total, we decided
to filter these out, ending up with 21,873 user profiles that are asso-
ciated with unique MMM members and addresses. From now on,
we use the terms “user” and “member” interchangeably but make
the distinction when deemed necessary.
Out of 21,873 user profiles, a total of 3,861 users shared their
age, 11,473 users shared their gender, and 2,588 users shared their
location information on their profiles. We found that, on average, a
user is 32.85 years old (σ=9.08). Gender distribution among users
is skewed, with 75.18% identifying as males. Finally, out of 80 dif-
ferent countries that users declared as their location, the top-3 are
Indonesia (570 users), China (434 users), and then India (383 users).
Each profile page on BitcoinTalk includes timestamps of regis-
tration date and last activity. We found that 21,751 users (99.44%)
registered from Sep 2015 to Mar 2016. Only 285 users (1.30%) have
made one or more posts, where the most active user has made 377
posts. Also, 21,461 users (98.12%) made their last activity between
Sep 2015 and Mar 2016. On average, the activity period of a user is
8.56 days (σ=43.89), with the longest period of activity reaching 5.4
years. We manually inspected of a random sample of these user pro-
files and found that all of them were registered to promote MMM
as part of MMM Extra scheme (see §2.2), as shown in Figure 2.
Finally, we used WalletExplorer8 to identify the wallet to which
a member address belongs, along with the wallet’s label when avail-
able. We removed all addresses that belong to wallets which are
8https://www.walletexplorer.com
labelled as non-exchange services, such as mining, gambling, and
mixing. We do this filtering because such addresses are owned by
services themselves, not members, and are not used for personal
transactions. In total, 12,104 addresses belonged to unlabelled wal-
lets, 3,632 addresses belonged to exchanges, that is, online wallets,
and 6,137 addresses belonged to non-exchange services. As such,
we ended up with 15,736 addresses, each associated with a unique
MMM member. We refer to these addresses as “Ponzi addresses.”
3.2 Transactions
We used BlockSci [25] v0.5.0 and Bitcoin Core v0.16.0 to collect all
transactions which include any of the Ponzi addresses as inputs,
outputs, or both. This resulted in 1,165,383 transactions. We then
divided the transactions into three types depending on where Ponzi
addresses appear in a transaction, as follows:
(1) Deposits: Ponzi addresses appear only as outputs but never
as inputs. Deposits move money into MMM.
(2) Ponzi: Ponzi addresses appear as both inputs and outputs.
Ponzi transactions circulate money within MMM.
(3) Withdrawals: Ponzi addresses appear only as inputs but
never as outputs. Withdrawals move money out of MMM.
We removed deposits that represent mining rewards (i.e., Coin-
base transactions), as they do not relate to MMM. We also removed
all Ponzi transactions which involve only a single Ponzi address as
an input and an output, as such transactions are likely payments
to an unknown address, with the change sent back to the Ponzi
address. We also removed other deposits and withdrawals that are
not related to the overall Ponzi operation of MMM. In particular,
we removed any deposit to a Ponzi address that is not followed by
a Ponzi transaction which has the address as an input or an output.
Similarly, we removed any withdrawal from a Ponzi address that is
not preceded by a Ponzi transaction which includes the address as
an input or an output. As such, we ended up with 291,172 deposits,
17,794 Ponzi transactions, and 113,987 withdrawals, adding up to a
total of 422,953 transactions.
3.3 External validation
We collected another dataset from Blockchain.com,9 a wallet and
blockchain explorer service. Our goal is to further validate the asso-
ciation of the collected addresses to MMM by showing transactions
linking addresses from both datasets. To achieve this, we repeated
the collection procedures described above for the second source
(Appendix A), and eventually found 187 transactions linking Ponzi
addresses from BitcoinTalk and Blockchain.com. In particular, 139
transactions were sent from addresses in the BitcoinTalk dataset to
addresses in the Blockchain.com dataset, with a total output value
of 56,714 dollars. Moreover, 38 transactions were sent in the other
direction, with a total output value of 47,145 dollars.
4 ANALYSIS
Next, we present a method with a set of metrics to quantitatively
analyze Ponzi schemes on Bitcoin from four aspects, namely their
lifecycle, Ponzi operation, externalities, and geopolitics. At the same
9https://www.blockchain.com
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Bootstrap Hyperoperation Collapse
First BitcoinTalk 
profile registered
Figure 3: Daily transaction volume (DTV).
time, we apply this method to MMM and characterize its operation
for the first time. We also summarize the metrics in Appendix B.
4.1 Lifecycle
Overall, MMM was operational for 2,111 days, or ≈5 years and 9.5
months, where the first transaction occurred on Oct 1, 2013, and
the last transaction occurred on Jul 14, 2019. However, 98.58% of
all transactions occurred in a 3-year period, starting on Sep 1, 2014,
and ending on Aug 31, 2017. We therefore restrict our analysis to
this period and focus on measuring the volume of transactions and
the corresponding flow of money.
4.1.1 Volume. We analyze the lifecycle of a scheme in terms of
its daily transaction volume (DTV), which is the number of deposit,
Ponzi, and withdrawal transactions on any given day. In particular,
we use DTV as a metric to model the lifecycle in the following three
consecutive phases, which are formally defined in Appendix C:
(1) Bootstrap: TheDTV grows steadilywith a relatively steeper
increase leading up to hyperoperation.
(2) Hyperoperation: This phase consists of a number of cycles.
In each cycle, the DTV grows nonlinearly, reaches a peak,
and then decays nonlinearly.
(3) Collapse: After that last decay of the last cycle in hyperop-
eration, the DTV decays steadily and approaches zero.
We applied the definitions toMMMand ended upwith the phases
highlighted in Figure 3. As shown in the figure, the hyperoperation
phase started on Sep 27, 2015, a few days after the first MMM mem-
ber registered her user profile on BitcoinTalk, and went through
two cycles before ending on Jun 28, 2016. The first cycle peaked on
Feb 29, 2016, with a DTV value of 3,714 transactions, after which
it ended coinciding with reports announcing that MMM stopped
paying its members in Apr 2016 [7]. The second cycle, on the other
hand, peaked on May 18, 2016, with a DTV value of 1,353 transac-
tions, which is less than half its value in the previous cycle.
The objective behind modeling the lifecycle in phases is to ana-
lyze the scheme when the Ponzi operation is in full gear, which is
captured by the hyperoperation phase, as presented in §4.2. While it
is possible for a Ponzi scheme to resurrect and go through the three
phases multiple times before stopping its operation completely, we
did not observe this behavior with MMM.
4.1.2 Money flow. Given the lifecycle model defined above, we
can measure how much money flows to and from the members of
Figure 4: Daily money flow (DMF).
Bitcoin Price Rally
Figure 5: Daily flow rate (DFR).
a Ponzi scheme in each of its phases. To accomplish that, we define
a metric called the daily money flow (DMF-f ) as the f -aggregate
of input or output values of Ponzi addresses which appear in the
transactions of a given day, where f is an aggregate function like the
sum, the mean, or the max. The values to consider for aggregation
depend on the transaction type in which a Ponzi address is an input
or an output, as defined in §3.2.
As shown in Figure 4, most of the money flow in MMM occurred
in the hyperoperation phase, with a peak DMF-sum value exceeding
150M dollars.10 The bootstrap phase, on the other hand, had an
10BlockSci uses CoinDesk to retrieve the price of Bitcoin in dollars on any given day.
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insignificant flow, with a peak DMF-sum value barely reaching
500K dollars. Unlike earlier phases, the collapse phase is dominated
by flows that are attributed to a relatively small number of deposits
and withdrawals with exceptionally large values, as evident by the
difference between DMF-max and DMF-mean. This also indicates
that MMMmembers have stopped participating in the scheme, with
nearly no Ponzi-related money flow.
To measure the average contribution of a transaction to the daily
money flow, we define a metric called the daily flow rate (DFR)
as the DMF-sum divided by the DTV, which is the average dollar
amount of a transaction per day. Figure 5 shows the DFR in MMM,
with a rapid increase in the collapse phase leading up to early 2017.
We think this could be attributed to the 2017 Bitcoin price rally [22],
or the reuse of the Ponzi addresses in other, possibly illicit, activities.
4.2 Ponzi Operation
We now focus on the hyperoperation phase and analyze Ponzi
transactions in terms of income inequality, return on investment,
and member classification. In MMM, a total of 8,680 Ponzi addresses
appeared in Ponzi transactions during this phase.
4.2.1 Income Inequality. In a Ponzi scheme, one expects a small
number of members to receive most of the money from its daily
operation. To measure the distribution of income across member,
we use a metric called the Gini index [20], which is often used to
measure income inequality in a population. A higher Gini index
indicates greater inequality, with high income individuals receiving
much larger percentages of the total income of the population.
We calculate the daily Gini index (DGI) as follows. First, on each
day, we calculate the sum of output values for each Ponzi address
in the corresponding Ponzi-receive transactions. We call this sum
the daily net income (DNI) of an address. We then calculate the
DGI as half of the relative mean absolute difference of DNI values
across all Ponzi addresses. The value of DGI is between 0 and 1,
where 0 indicates perfect equality in which every member has the
same income, and 1 indicates perfect inequality in which only one
member receives all the income.
As shown in Figure 6, the DGI of MMM has an average of 0.68
and is nearly always higher than 0.35. As a reference, the Gini index
of the UK in the financial year ending 2019 is 32.5% [1]. This makes
it one of the world’s most unequal rich countries where the richest
10% receive more than 40% of the total income. As such, the DGI
captures one aspect of MMM’s Ponzi operation, in which a high
concentration of income is received by a small number of members.
4.2.2 Return on Investment. A Ponzi scheme generates returns
on investments (ROIs) for older members by acquiring investments
from new members, ultimately leading to a scenario where one
member’s profit is another member’s loss. As such, a Ponzi scheme
resembles a zero-sum game, where the sum of profits and losses
among all members on any given day is equal to zero. To measure
this effect, we first define a new metric for an address, called the
daily net worth (DNW), as the difference between the address’s DNI
and the daily net spending (DNS), where DNS is the sum of its input
values in each Ponzi-send transaction on any given day. A negative
DNW value means the member associated with the address has lost
money, while a positive DNW value means the member has made
Second CycleFirst Cycle
Figure 6: Daily Gini index (DGI).
Period with peak DTV 
and DMF-Sum values
Period with peak DTV 
and DMF-Sum values
Figure 7: Daily net difference (DND).
money. Next, we define a new metric called the daily net difference
(DND) as the sum-aggregate of DNW values across all addresses.
In concept, the DND value should be equal to zero and a non-zero
value indicates that some money has been sent to or received from
unknown addresses in Ponzi transactions. While these unknown
addresses could be associated with the Ponzi scheme, we cannot
simply include them without verification from other sources.
As shown in Figure 7, the DND of MMM indicates that it exhibits
a Ponzi zero-sum ROI model for most of its operation. However,
there are occasions whenmoney has been sent from Ponzi addresses
to unknown ones, effectively “leaking” out from MMM. To measure
the impact of this leakage, we calculate the total DND, which is the
sum of DND values in the hyperoperation phase. If the total DND
value is positive, then money is “pumped” into the Ponzi scheme.
Otherwise, money is leaked out from the scheme. We also calculate
the total absolute DND, which is the sum of absolute DND values
in the hyperoperation phase. For MMM, we found a total DND
value of -73.8M dollars and an absolute DND value of 73.9M dollars,
which means most of the money is leaked, not pumped, and that
the metrics we measured, those that involve Ponzi transactions in
particular, represent lower-bound estimates of their actual values.
The lowest DND value, which is dated on Mar 2, 2016, is about
eight million dollars and coincided with both the highest DTV value,
shown in Figure 3, and the highest DMF-sum value of the first cycle
in the hyperoperation phase, shown in Figure 4. This is also one
example where a metric, such as DMF, excludes a significant sum of
money due to unknown addresses in Ponzi transactions. The lowest
DND value corresponds to 346 Ponzi transactions that include 9,167
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Figure 8: Final normalized total net worth (TNW-norm(dn )).
unknown addresses with no intersection with those from the first
peak, where only 0.19% of the total input value and 0.01% of the
total output value were associated with Ponzi addresses. The second
lowest DND value, on the other hand, corresponds to 178 Ponzi
transactions that include 3,780 unknown addresses, where only
0.2% of the total input value and 0.01% of the total output value
were associated with Ponzi addresses.
4.2.3 Member Classification. While income inequality, as mea-
sured by the DGI, and a zero-sum ROI, as measured by the DND,
indicate a Ponzi operation, thesemetrics do not answer the question:
who are the victims and their likely scammers?We next address this
question by applying profitability analysis to Ponzi transactions.
First, we define a newmetric for an address on day di of hyperop-
eration, called the total net worth (TNW(di )), as the sum of its DNW
values from the first day of hyperoperation, d1, until day di ≤ dn ,
where dn is the last day of hyperoperation. After that, we normalize
TNW(di ) by dividing its value by the number of Ponzi transactions
which involve the address as an input or an output between d1 and
di . We refer to this normalized metric by TNW-norm(di ).
On every day di , we rank all Ponzi addresses of the scheme based
on their TNW-norm(di ) value in a descending order. As such, we
can classify each address under the following rules:
(1) TNW-norm(di )<0: Associated member is a victim, as the
member has lost money.
(2) TNW-norm(di )≥0: Associated member is not a victim, as
the member has not lost money or has made some money.
(3) TNW-norm(di )≫0: Associatedmember is likely a scammer,
as the member has made disproportionately more profit.
To get an end-result view of member classification, we calculate
TNW-norm(dn ), which is the final TNW-norm value for each Ponzi
address in the scheme at the end of its hyperoperation phase. As
shown in Figures 8, nearly 41% of addresses have a value that is less
Period with MMM ban 
and regulatory actions
Figure 9: Cumulative victim ratio (CVR(di )).
than zero, which classifies their corresponding members as victims.
This view, however, does not show how this percentage changes
over time. Instead, we define a new metric for the scheme on day di
of its hyperoperation, called the cumulative victim ratio (CVR(di )),
as the ratio of addresses which are classified as victims on day di
according to rules (1) and (2) above.
As shown in Figure 9, the CVR(di ) in MMM increases every day
over a period of five months until it reaches 0.41, after which it hits
a plateau in Mar 2016. This also coincides with the end of the first
cycle of the hyperoperation phase, after which the scheme’s DTV
never fully recovers, leading up to a significantly lower peak in the
second cycle, as shown in Figure 3. The decrease in DTV also maps
to a reduced DMF-sum in the second cycle, especially from Ponzi
transactions, as shown in Figure 4. Together, the high CVR(di ) value
and the low DTV and DMF-Sum values, indicate that victims have
realized they are being scammed and have therefore reduced their
participation in MMM. Interestingly, this also coincides with the
ban of MMM in China [6] and the regulatory actions taken in South
Africa against MMM in late Feb 2016 [8].
To identify likely scammers, we used the following procedure:
First, on each day di during the hyperoperation phase, we find a list
of top-10 Ponzi addresses which have the highest TNW-norm(di )
values of the day. After that, for each month, we select the Ponzi
addresses that made it to any of the daily top-10 lists of the month.
Finally, we classify a Ponzi address as a likely scammer address if
it consistently appears in each month, as the member associated
with such an address has gained significant profits, month after
month, but never a loss. Table 2 presents the top-10 likely scammer
addresses of MMM, ranked by their non-normalized, final TNW
value. All but one of these addresses have a wallet size of 1, which
means their corresponding members have used the same Ponzi
address to perform one or more transactions during hyperoperation.
Moreover, the user profiles associated with these addresses were
registered from Oct 2015 to Feb 2016, which is just before the DTV
peaked in the first cycle. The top deposits and withdrawals in terms
of dollar value which are associated with some of these addresses,
such the 1st and the 6th, involve common but unknown addresses,
suggesting they might be connected. We study similar externalities
in the upcoming section.
4.3 Externalities
Scheme externalities, such as connections with other cryptocur-
rency activities, are important for understanding how a scheme
6
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Table 2: Top-10 likely scammer addresses of MMM.
Final TNW Wallet size Registration date Top deposit from Top withdrawal to
Address (dollars) (# addresses) (yyyy-mm-dd) Address Wallet Address Wallet
1NGpnazTZR. . . 764,988 1 2015-10-18 1LVXa7xrFn. . . 9877f5d228. . . 1LVXa7xrFn. . . 9877f5d228. . .
1HM6Eo2GH2. . . 137,490 1 2016-02-25 15cqdF756h. . . d9e0f29d92. . . 1FXHTFWdUXa. . . de36bf7fec. . .
17NZuQpVnk. . . 87,726 17 2015-11-14 1GvAtUaDA4. . . 0747e64bec. . . 1PLozjRDdof. . . 00007d59f2. . .
1DpHywDhof. . . 76,152 1 2015-11-22 1MBsJCWVkh. . . 7066e604b0. . . 1HWeepQYBE. . . Huobi
1CXNqE5tRF. . . 45,331 1 2015-12-10 17F2jPnJGT. . . b09dc54caf. . . 1HaitFo3qg. . . df8997c4de. . .
176tD4SZRp. . . 41,044 1 2015-11-19 1LVXa7xrFn. . . 9877f5d228. . . 1LVXa7xrFn. . . 9877f5d228. . .
1Hr7fCEgEx. . . 40,519 1 2016-02-25 1FTNFUPTkY. . . ce8baa8e76. . . 1GuPNdy5Db. . . cc368bd729. . .
15sJ8Bta2U. . . 38,297 1 2015-11-01 1KmNg57zJ. . . Luno 1KmNg57zJ. . . Luno
1Nya6D7tUL. . . 34,677 1 2016-02-13 1AZnsXDnF2. . . 00027af4ad. . . 1E2ajjqSMp. . . 05eb115abd. . .
1DdLoYsYbC. . . 20,259 1 2016-02-25 1KiA9UiNmu. . . 31fd492691. . . 1HDTpBqrv4. . . 070655f16c. . .
operates within the whole cryptocurrency ecosystem. We now fo-
cus on investigating where deposits come from and withdrawals go
to by analyzing the wallets associated with these transactions. First,
for each non-Ponzi address that appears as an input of a deposit or
an output of a withdrawal, we get its wallet from WalletExplorer
along with the wallet’s label when available. We then group the wal-
lets into eight categories, where each category specifies a service
type to which the wallet belongs based on its labels, as follows:
(1) Unknown: A personal wallet or unknown service.
(2) Exchanges: A cryptocurrency exchange service.
(3) Pools: A cryptocurrency mining pool.
(4) Generic: A service that deals with Bitcoin such as payment
processors, wallet services, and marketplaces.
(5) Mixers: A cryptocurrency tumbling service.
(6) Gambling: A cryptocurrency casino or a gambling service.
(7) Ponzi: A service promoting fraudulent schemes that promise
high returns, including fake initial coin offerings (ICOs).
(8) Darkweb: A Tor hidden service operating on the dark web.
Finally, we calculate the percentage of deposits and withdrawals
that fall under each one of these categories.
As shown in Figure 10, most of the deposits (85.54%) and with-
drawals (91.57%) are associated with addresses that have unlabelled
wallets, which means they might belong to personal, possibly mem-
ber, wallets or simply to an unknown service. For those which we
were able to identify, however, the highest percentages were asso-
ciated with exchange services, with 4.8 times more withdrawals
associated with exchanges than deposits. Moreover, there is a clear
link betweenMMMand gambling services, whichmeans theymight
be operated by the same entities. It is difficult to analyze why such
links exist and for what reason, but one possible explanation is that
certain MMM members might have tried to launder their profits
using these services. The use of mixers or darkweb services further
suggests that some MMM members are actively trying to conceal
their identity, or have been involved in other illicit activities.
It is important to highlight that such an analysis is useful for law
enforcement, as an investigation agency can work with regulated
exchanges, which have to comply with know-your-customer (KYC)
and anti-money laundering (AML) laws, to reveal the identities of
likely scammers, once they cash out their profits.
Unknown (85.541%) 
Exchanges (07.321%) 
Pools (02.970%) 
Generic (02.784%) 
Mixers (01.158%) 
Gambling (00.211%) 
Ponzi (00.013%) 
Darkweb (00.001%) 
(91.567%) Unknown 
(35.136%) Exchanges 
(02.310%) Pools 
(04.518%) Generic 
(01.196%) Mixers 
(01.195%) Gambling 
(00.000%) Ponzi 
(00.020%) Darkweb 
Deposits	 Withdrawals	
Ponzi	
MMM	
Figure 10: External cryptocurrency services and MMM.
4.4 Geopolitics
Ponzi schemes target various countries and are particularly success-
ful in developing or low-income economies [23, 26, 36, 42]. We now
analyze the geopolitical reach of MMM and focus on how money
flows between member countries. First, we use the location infor-
mation shared by MMMmembers on their BitcoinTalk user profiles
(§3.1) to determine the country in which a member is located. We
then group all Ponzi address that appear in Ponzi transactions by
the country of their associated members. After that, for each group
of addresses, we model it as a node in a directed graph called the
geopolitical network. If any of the members who are located in a
country have sent money to members who are located in another,
we add an edge between the corresponding two nodes in the graph.
The size of a node is relative to the number of members who are
located in the corresponding country, and the thickness of an edge
is relative to the amount of money which has been sent between
the corresponding two countries, as per the direction of the edge.
Figure 11 shows the geopolitical network of MMM as a graph
consisting of 23 nodes and 46 edges. It is clear that the scheme has
extended its reach across the globe, fromAfrica, to Asia, Europe, and
even Australia. MMM is also popular in the Caribbean and Brazil,
which means it covers all the five continents. India and Indonesia
are the two most prominent countries in MMM in terms of how
much money they have circulated with others, making them central
nodes in the graph. Countries like the USA, China, and Thailand
are well-connected to each other, forming a small community in
the graph along with India and Indonesia.
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PhilippinesBotswana
USA
India
Taiwan
SwazilandSouth Africa
Malaysia
Germany
Myanmar
Thailand
Australia
Indonesia
Kazakhstan
Cambodia
UK
Bangladesh
China
Pakistan
Hungary
Lithuania
Bulgaria
Latvia
Figure 11: The geopolitical network of MMM.
In terms of pairwise money flow, we found that the largest flow
in MMM was between India and Indonesia, which was almost ten
times the amount between Thailand and Taiwan, the pair with
the smallest money flow. Moreover, it turns out that this pairwise
money flow is highly asymmetrical. For example, members in In-
donesia have received 12 times more money than they have sent to
those in India. We also found that Indonesia, the highest receiving
country, had received four times more money than the second-
highest receiving country, Malaysia. These results suggest a few
hypotheses, one of which is that Indonesia might be a central hub
for MMM operators. This observation is supported by the fact that
a significant amount of money is withdrawn from MMM through
an Indonesian Bitcoin exchange (§4.3).
5 DISCUSSION
This work, while having a number of limitations, has several impli-
cations for issues related to cryptocurrency regulations, economy,
and user privacy. Next, we discuss these issues in detail.
5.1 Implications
First of all, it is important for governments to protect their people
against financial e-crimes, such as operating a Bitcoin Ponzi scheme.
During the first two quarters of 2019 alone, more than 4.26 billion
dollars were lost due thefts, scams, and other misappropriation of
funds from cryptocurrency users and exchanges [12]. The compli-
cated nature of Ponzi schemes and the sophistication of Bitcoin’s
pseudo-anonymous privacy model have created a thriving environ-
ment for criminals to engage with various illicit activities. Moreover,
the lack of effective mechanisms to identify cryptocurrency fraud
sparked an urgent need for governments and regulators to come
up with solutions. Fraud protection is part of the mandate of many
financial regulators, and we believe that the analytical method and
the set of metrics presented herein could be useful for customer
protection and regulatory compliance. Combined with data mining
and machine learning techniques (§6), our investigation shows that
new tools can be developed for better feature extraction, risk scor-
ing, and automatic cryptocurrency fraud detection [11]. Such tools
can be used by financial e-crime investigators and cryptocurrency
exchanges to block transactions involving illicit activities.
Second, cryptocurrency fraud can cause significant damage to
local economies. As we showed in §4.4, the impact on the economy
of several countries is a matter of concern. This could become a
serious threat to monetary sovereignty, especially for developing
countries, which are often targeted by Ponzi schemes. Therefore, it
is important for governments to continuously monitor and prevent
illicit cryptocurrency activities to protect their people and economy,
and to thwart other issues, such as money laundering.
Third and last, the feasibility of this study raises a user privacy
issue.While the identification of scammers is important, we showed
that nearly half of MMM members are victims (§4.2). These inno-
cent people might not be privacy-savvy and are not aware of the
risks associated with the participation in such activities. At a cer-
tain point, unveiling a Ponzi scheme requires deanonymization of
user identities, which could expose the innocent ones to privacy
breaches. For example, these users might have their names asso-
ciated with financial fraud which could affect their credit history
negatively. Moreover, sophisticated deanonymization techniques
could extend to other Bitcoin addresses in their wallets, exposing
more information about their financial activities [24].
5.2 Limitations
In what follows, we discuss themain limitations of the study and the
steps we took to reduce their impact on the results when possible.
5.2.1 Data collection. Wewere able to collect a significant amount
of Bitcoin addresses that are associated withMMMmembers mainly
due to its aggressive marketing strategy. However, these addresses
and their corresponding online identities are scraped from public
user profiles that are not 100% reliable. In a system where users are
hidden behind pseudonyms, it is difficult to establish an absolute,
complete ground truth. Nevertheless, we followed a strict validation
procedure in order to filter out noise and irrelevant addresses or
transactions, as described in §3.
The zero-sum analysis presented in §4.2 also serves as a valid-
ity test for our dataset. In particular, it helps in quantifying the
scale and impact of missed or excluded Ponzi addresses and their
corresponding transactions. In particular, Figure 7 shows that for
the significant majority of the hyperoperation phase, the Ponzi
addresses included in our dataset yield Ponzi transactions with a
near-zero-sum ROI, which denotes a relatively complete coverage
of MMM’s Ponzi operation among the considered members. At two
significant instances, however, we acknowledge that the collected
Ponzi addresses, and hence corresponding Ponzi transactions, were
not complete and resulted in money leaks. Given that DNW-Sum
in Figure 7 is almost aligned with zero most of the time, it is safe to
assume that the impact of the missing addresses and transactions is
minimal. We would like to note that it is also possible that entities
who sent money to unknown addresses might have deliberately
done so for various reasons, such as paying someone or a service in
the same Ponzi transaction, even though those unknown addresses
do not belong to MMM.
To this end, our analysis shows that the collected dataset, while
likely incomplete in terms of considering every MMM member and
transaction, is still representative of MMM’s operations, as we were
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able to capture its underlying Ponzi nature. One could increase the
size of the dataset by crawling more public sources (Appendix A)
or including more addresses using inference heuristics [28]. Such
heuristics include adding new addresses by transitivity, where an
unknown address receives money from and sends money to Ponzi
addresses, or by closure, where the unknown address is grouped
under awallet to which a Ponzi address belongs.We do not use these
heuristics simply because they bias and inflate the results [16, 24].
5.2.2 Analysis. From an analysis standpoint, we think that the
temporal times-series analysis we performed herein does not pro-
vide a holistic view of a Ponzi scheme, leaving some interesting
aspects undiscovered. We mainly studied events and money flow
over time, but we did not study relationships among MMM trans-
actions and members. Studying the scheme as a transaction or user
graph could potentially reveal new characteristics that provide a
broader understanding of underlying interactions. As such, includ-
ing graph analysis could further enrich the investigation, and we
leave it for a future work.
6 RELATEDWORK
Financial fraud is a centuries old phenomenon that researchers have
been trying to understand and resolve [18, 39–41]. With the recent
advent of cryptocurrencies, especially Bitcoin [3, 9, 34], these cur-
rency networks have inadvertently become platforms for an array
of fraudulent and unlawful schemes [33, 35, 43]. However, Bitcoin’s
main goal was and is still to decentralize and liberate traditional
banking [21, 27, 46]. For people with privacy expectations, Bitcoin
also provided pseudo-anonymity so that identities are masked to a
significant extent [31, 38].
Bitcoin’s pseudo-anonymity has been used by criminals as a layer
to hide behind and evade law enforcement and regulators [10, 32].
Previous work has shown that services, such as mining scams, Ponzi
schemes, scam wallets, and fraudulent exchanges are prevalent in
the cryptocurrency ecosystem [10, 44]. For example, more than half
of the bitcoin exchanges either got hacked, were forced to close, or
have scammed users [29].
Money laundering [40] and Ponzi schemes [30] have long existed
before Bitcoin. Money laundering in Bitcoin, however, has received
more attention from the research community [14, 32]. Money laun-
dering can be used for various reasons, such as evading taxes [37]
or hiding money accumulated using unlawful means [40]. The main
difference between money laundering and a Ponzi scheme is that
the later targets ordinary people to steal their money [2]. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate a real-world
Ponzi scheme on Bitcoin.
A recent, closely-related work proposed a data mining technique
to detect Bitcoin addresses that are involved in Ponzi schemes [5].
In their study, the authors provide an automatic analysis of Ponzi
schemes over Bitcoin using supervised learning algorithms. In par-
ticular, they manually collected Bitcoin addresses from different
forums and discussion boards. Then they used a clustering heuris-
tic [28] in order to expand the collected dataset. They also define
a set of features to be used in Bitcoin addresses classification. Fur-
thermore, by using different classifiers, they tried to detect features
from other addresses related to Ponzi schemes. Their best classifier
was able to classify 31 out of 32 Ponzi schemes, with 1% false posi-
tives. Interestingly, the authors have explicitly excluded MMM, as
its transaction history was too complicated for automated detec-
tion using the simple features they used. In contrast, in our work,
we do not aim to identify Ponzi schemes but rather analyze their
operation using a set of metrics. We show, in the case of MMM,
that more sophisticated features, which could be derived from the
metrics, are needed to effectively capture the Ponzi operation.
7 CONCLUSION
We presented the first in-depth analysis of a real-world Ponzi
scheme on Bitcoin. We analyzed 432K Bitcoin transaction involv-
ing 16K addresses associated with MMM. We showed that MMM
exhibits many properties of a Ponzi scheme, including a short life
span, income inequality, a zero-sum return on investment model, an
increasing number of victims over time, involvement of exchanges,
and a global reach.
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A SUPPLEMENTARY DATASET
We crawled Blockchain.com to search for public tags of Bitcoin ad-
dresses which are associated with MMM. After cleaning, we ended
Table 3: Top-10 most frequent MMM tags.
Label Frequency
mmm universe.help 46
mmm global 13
bonus from mmm universe.help 9
mmm indonesia 6
mmm nusantara 4
mmm china 2
mmm india 2
mmm indonesia 2
mmm philippines 2
mmm russia 2
up with 181 addresses, each associated with a unique MMM tag.
We then used BlockSci to extract the corresponding transactions.
After cleaning, we ended up with 7,322 transactions.
A.1 Addresses
Blockchain.com is one of the most popular wallet and blockchain
explorer services. As of Feb, 2019, the platform hosted 33M user
wallets and was used to perform more than 200B transactions in
140 countries. On Blockchain.com, users can tag a Bitcoin address
with a short label and a URL by either submitting a hyperlink as a
reference or digitally sign a random message using the private key
of the address being tagged. This information is used to verify the
ownership of an addresses and its tag, and to annotate the corre-
sponding transactions in the blockchain. Based on the platform’s
popularity, we used it as a second source to collect Bitcoin addresses
that are associated with MMM members.
We downloaded 600 address tag pages, each containing tag in-
formation of at most 50 addresses, by retrieving a page using a
unique URL indexed by a tag identifier. There are also two tag
types, submitted links and signed messages, that are represented
by two unique identifiers in the URL. This resulted in about 40MB
of unparsed address tag pages in HTML format. We then parsed
the pages to extract Bitcoin addresses and their tag information,
namely their short labels, URLs, and whether a tag is verified. We
ended up with 30,009 tagged Bitcoin addresses, out of which 29,643
addresses (98.78%) had verified tags.
We identify MMM tags by looking at their tag label. In particular,
if the short label of a tag contains “mmm” substring, we mark the
corresponding address as a candidate. Accordingly, out of 29,643
verified tagged addresses, we found 202 candidates (0.68%). After
manual inspection, we excluded 21 addresses, as they are not likely
related to MMM (e.g., a tag with a short label “hmmmm”). This
resulted in 181 addresses that haveMMM tags, out of which two tags
were verified by submitted hyperlinks and 179 tags were verified
by digitally-signed messages. We only consider these validated,
verified MMM tags. We consider the corresponding addresses to be
associated with MMM, as their tag labels include the scheme’s name
in addition to relevant contextual information, such as whether
the tag represents a certain country, a global support fund, or a
member, as shown in Table 3.
10
Investigating MMM Ponzi scheme on Bitcoin Technical Report, December, 2019
Table 4: Summary of metrics
Acronym Name Brief definition
DTV Daily transaction volume Number of deposit, Ponzi, and withdrawal transactions on any given day
DMF-f Daily money flow f -aggregate of input or output values of Ponzi addresses which appear in the transactions of a given day
DFR Daily flow rate DMF-sum divided by DTV
DNI Daily net income Sum of output values for a Ponzi address in the corresponding Ponzi-receive transactions on any given day
DGI Daily Gini index Half of the relative mean absolute difference of DNI values across all Ponzi addresses
DNS Daily net spending Sum of the input values for a Ponzi address in each Ponzi-send transaction on any given day
DNW Daily net worth Difference between DNI and DNS of a Ponzi address on any given day
DND Daily net difference Sum-aggregate of DNW values across all Ponzi addresses
TNW(di ) Total net worth Sum of a Ponzi address DNW values from the first day of hyperoperation until a given day di
TNW-norm(di ) Normalized TNW(di ) TNW(di ) divided by number of Ponzi transactions involving the address as an input or an output until day di
CVR(di ) Cumulative victim ratio Ratio of addresses which are classified as victims on day di
A.2 Transactions
We used BlockSci to collect all transactions which include any of the
MMM addresses as inputs, outputs, or both. This resulted in 9,293
transactions. We then grouped the transactions into three types,
namely deposits, Ponzi, and withdrawals, and removed invalid
transactions, as discussed in §3.2. We ended up with 6,853 deposits,
97 Ponzi transactions, and 372 withdrawals, adding up to a total of
7,322 transactions.
B METRICS
As a quick reference, we refer the reader to Table 4, which presents
a summary of the metrics defined and used in this paper.
C FORMAL MODEL
Let vols = {v0, . . . ,vn } be the daily transaction volume of a Ponzi
scheme where vi ≥ 0 is the volume on the i-th day. Our goal is to
partition vols intro three disjoint sets, each representing one of
the three phases, namely bootstrap, hyperoperation, and collapse.
To achieve this, it is enough to find the set that corresponds to the
middle phase, as the partitioning preserves the ordering in vols.
In Listing 1, we define the hyperoperation phase computationally
by finding its start day, end day, and cycles. This phase consists of
one or more cycles, each having its own start and end days. The
first cycle is the one that has the largest daily transaction volume,
also referred to as the first peak. The start day of the phase is the
start day of the earliest cycle. Similarly, the end day of the phase is
the end day of the latest cycle.
As described in Listing 2, a cycle is defined by the start day that
is before the day of its peak and on which the volume is at most
1/д-th of the peak, where д is a growth factor. In other words, the
start day is the latest day before the day of the peak after which the
volume grows by a factor of д. The end day of the cycle is defined
similarly, albeit after the peak day. Listing 3 shows how to find the
peak volume of a period of time as specified by two days.
We define the growth factor such that the first peak is an order
of magnitude higher than the volume of the last day of the previous
cycle or phase, if there is only one cycle, as described in Listing 4.
We chose a factor of 10 in order to model nonlinearity in the growth
during the hyperoperation phase. For the second cycle in this phase,
the growth factor is defined as the factor of the first cycle multiplied
by the ratio between the two peaks. This makes sure that this cycle
Listing 1: get_phase(vols)
start_day = 0
end_day = len(vols)-1
phase = {
'starts': end_day,
'ends': start_day,
'cycles': []
}
# first cycle
phase['cycles'].append(
get_cycle(vols, cycles, start_day, end_day)
)
# cycles before the first
while True:
cycle = get_cycle(
vols, cycles,
start_day,
phase['cycles'][-1]['starts']
)
if valid_cycle(cycle, phase['cycles']):
phase['cycles'].append(cycle)
else:
phase['starts'] = phase['cycles'][-1]['starts']
break
# cycles after the first
while True:
cycle = get_cycle(
vols, cycles,
phase['cycles'][-1]['ends'],
end_day
)
if valid_cycle(cycle, phase['cycles']):
phase['cycles'].append(cycle)
else:
phase['ends'] = phase['cycles'][-1]['ends']
break
return phase
is defined over a period that is relative to the change in peaks. As
such, this definition is applied recursively for proceedings cycles.
Finally, we keep adding new cycles until we reach an invalid one,
which is determined based on its duration, as described in Listing 5.
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Listing 2: get_cycle(vols, cycles, start_day, end_day)
peak_vol, peak_day = get_peak(vols, start_day, end_day)
cycle = {
'starts': peak_day,
'ends': peak_day,
'duration': 0,
'peak_vol': peak_vol,
'peak_day': peak_day,
'factor': get_factor(cycles, peak_vol)
}
# days before the peak
for day in range(cycle['peak_day'], start_day, -1):
if vols[day-1] <= cycle['peak_vol']/cycle['factor']:
cycle['starts'] = day-1
# days after the peak
for day in range(cycle['peak_day'], end_day, 1):
if vol[day+1] <= cycle['peak_vol']/cycle['factor']:
cycle['ends'] = day+1
if len(cycles) > 1:
cycle['starts'] = max(cycle['starts'],
cycles[-1]['ends'])
cycle['duration'] = cycle['ends'] - cycle['starts']
return cycle
Listing 3: get_peak(vols, start_day, end_day)
peak_vol = 0
peak_day = 0
for day in range(start_day, end_day):
vol = vols[day]
if vol > peak_vol:
peak_vol = vol
peak_day = day
return peak_vol, peak_day
Listing 4: get_factor(cycles, peak_vol)
if len(cycles) == 0:
return 10
else:
last_cycle = cycles[-1]
vol_ratio = peak_vol / last_cycle['peak_vol']
return max(1, last_cycle['factor'] * vol_ratio)
Listing 5: valid_cycle(cycle, cycles)
low = cycles[-1]['duration'] / cycle['factor']
valid_low = cycle['duration'] >= low
valid_high = cycle['duration'] < cycles[-1]['duration']
return valid_low and valid_high
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